Standing Committee F

[Mr. Derek Conway in the Chair]

Justice (Northern Ireland) Bill

Derek Conway: Before I call the Minister, I have two housekeeping points to make. First, because the clock is not accurate we shall have to rely on the House of Commons Annunciator screen for timing. Secondly, it will be acceptable for those hon. Members who wish to remove their jackets to do so, as this Room seems to get rather hot from time to time.

Des Browne: I beg to move,
 That —
 (1) during proceedings on the Justice (Northern Ireland) Bill the Standing Committee do meet on Tuesdays at half-past Ten o'clock and at half-past Four o'clock and on Thursdays at half-past Nine o'clock and at half-past Two o'clock;
 (2) the proceedings shall be taken in the following order, namely Clauses 1 and 2, Schedule 1, Clause 3, Schedule 2, Clauses 4 and 5, Schedule 3, Clauses 6 to 11, Schedule 4, Clauses 12 and 13, Schedule 5, Clauses 14 to 20, Schedule 6, Clauses 21 and 22, New Clauses and New Schedules relating to Part 1, Clauses 23 to 29, Schedule 7, Clauses 30 to 44, New Clauses and New Schedules relating to Part 2, Clause 45, Schedule 8, Clauses 46 to 50, Schedule 9, Clauses 51 and 52, New Clauses and New Schedules relating to Part 3, Clauses 53 to 62, Schedule 10, Clause 63, Schedule 11, Clauses 64 and 65, New Clauses and New Schedules relating to Part 4, Clauses 66 to 80, New Clauses and New Schedules relating to Part 5, Clauses 81 to 83, Schedule 12, Clause 84, Schedule 13, Clauses 85 to 91 and remaining New Clauses and New Schedules;
(3) the proceedings on Clauses 1 and 2, Schedule 1, Clause 3, Schedule 2, Clauses 4 and 5, Schedule 3, Clauses 6 to 11, Schedule 4, Clauses 12 and 13, Schedule 5, Clauses 14 to 20, Schedule 6, Clauses 21 and 22 and New Clauses and New Schedules relating to Part 1 (so far as not previously concluded) shall be brought to a conclusion at 11.25 a.m on Thursday 31st January 2002;
(4) the proceedings on Clauses 23 to 29, Schedule 7, Clauses 30 to 44 and New Clauses and New Schedules relating to Part 2 (so far as not previously concluded) shall be brought to a conclusion at 7 p.m. on Tuesday 31st February 2002;
(5) the proceedings on Clause 45, Schedule 8, Clauses 46 to 50, Schedule 9, Clauses 51 and 52, New Clauses and New Schedules relating to Part 3, Clauses 53 to 62, Schedule 10, Clause 63, Schedule 11, Clauses 64 and 65 and New Clauses and New Schedules relating to Part 4 (so far as not previously concluded) shall be brought to a conclusion at 1 p.m. on Tuesday 12th February 2002;
(6) the remaining proceedings on the Bill (so. far as not previously concluded) shall be brought to a conclusion at 5 p.m. on Thursday 14th February 2002.
 My first task is to ask the Committee to approve the Programming Sub-Committee's resolution. Copies of the resolution have been distributed to all members of the Committee.
 Before proceeding to that task, however, I take this opportunity to welcome you, Mr. Conway, to our proceedings. The members of the Programming Sub-Committee had the pleasure earlier this morning of sitting under the chairmanship of your co-Chairman, Mr. Pike, who informed us that it is intended that you will chair the morning sittings and that he will chair the afternoon sittings. I have not previously had the pleasure of being a member of a Committee chaired by you, Mr. Conway, but I welcome you in the knowledge that you have a reputation for being fair and knowledgeable. I undertake, as far as I am able, to keep myself well and truly in order, and I hope not to trouble you too much. 
 The programme motion provides for the proceedings of the Committee to take place over three weeks, with four sittings each week. The Government's initial estimate, before the recent consultation, was that the Committee would require between 12 and 16 sittings. However, in the light of the considerable pressures on the legislative programme and as a consequence of the consultation, we are content to proceed on the basis set out in the programming motion. We accept that an appropriate balance has been struck. 
 The motion also sets out the time available for consideration of the various parts of the Bill. It is important that the Committee has adequate time to consider the important matters contained in the latter parts of the Bill, such as the provisions on youth conferencing and community safety. It would be in no one's interest to allow proceedings to become bogged down on earlier provisions at the expense of the other equally important issues later in the Bill, which is why the time has been divided as it has.

Crispin Blunt: I have been reflecting on the Minister's remarks about the legislative programme and the need for haste in our proceedings. Will he go into a little more detail on what he is driving at?

Des Browne: I would have thought that the hon. Gentleman has some understanding of what is meant by the phrase ''legislative programme'' in the context of this place. What is driving me, as the Minister responsible for the Bill, is a desire to put in place the legislative framework necessary to start practical work on changing the criminal justice system in Northern Ireland. There is a commitment that, when appropriate after the 2003 Assembly elections in Northern Ireland, the Government will carry out their intention of devolving responsibility for criminal justice to the Assembly and the Executive. All parties represented in the House, and certainly in the Committee, with one possible exception, share that commitment.
 In my discussions with colleagues in the House and with local politicians, there is a clear understanding that certain legislative provisions must be in place as soon as possible, certainly in this Session, if that objective is to be achieved and certain changes are to take place. As was made clear in the implementation plan that accompanied the draft Bill, other review 
 provisions and recommendations that do not require legislative change have also to be put in place, and we are making progress on those. That is what I mean by the legislative programme so far as it relates to the Bill. 
 It is worth reminding hon. Members of the extent of the consultation that has already taken place on the criminal justice review, which contains the genesis of most of the provisions of the Bill. The review group undertook an extensive consultation process before producing its conclusions. After its report was published in March 2000, the Government undertook six months of consultation. 
 The Government have also given the official Opposition extensive access to officials so that the draft Bill could be explained. We have offered such access to all other parties. In my experience—it cannot be contradicted or gainsaid—the amount of access to officials that the official Opposition have had on the Bill is unprecedented. 
 The most recent consultation period on the draft Bill and implementation plan, which concluded earlier this month, was the third occasion on which people had the opportunity to contribute their views on the review provisions. Nothing in the substance of the Bill should have been a surprise, and I suspect that nothing was. Few new issues, if any, have arisen in the latest consultation process. The periods of consultation to which the review and the Bill have been subject have resulted in a narrow focus on issues of contention. Other issues that affect the Bill require to be examined appropriately in Committee, but the Government think that there is more than enough time to do so. 
 There is no question that we are inhibiting Parliament's ability to contribute to the Bill. In the history of this Parliament, no legislation has received contributions to the same extent as the Bill. We have made it clear that we would be happy to consider taking any constructive amendments on board in Committee or at any other stage of the parliamentary process. Even the timetabling of the Bill will be kept under review, and we will be happy to discuss with representatives of the other parties in Committee as progress is made.

Crispin Blunt: I beg to move, as an amendment to the motion, to leave out paragraphs (3), (4) and (5).
 I join the Minister in welcoming you to the Chair, Mr. Conway. Like him, it is the first time that I have served under your chairmanship. Given your reputation and the duties placed on you in your occupation of the Chair, I am sure that you will be fair to all members of the Committee. 
 Members of the Committee should not be entirely surprised that they did not have the opportunity to examine the programme motion before our sitting. Members of the Programming Sub-Committee did not receive it until we arrived to consider the matter at 8.30 this morning. There has been a regrettable failure to notify the Opposition parties of the Government's intentions in this regard, which would have enabled us to agree on the programme. However, I am afraid that that sort of behaviour is consistent with the Government's wider attitude towards the programming of Committees, and I regret that.
 The Minister said that the way in which the Bill has been considered is unique. I agree that the wider consultation process from which the Bill has emerged was a model. I should like to record my thanks to the Minister for his offer to the Opposition parties to consult with civil servants. We were pleased to be able to take up that opportunity. I should also like to record my gratitude to those civil servants for the time that they dedicated to this necessarily complicated legislation. Those of us who are not lawyers very much appreciated their expertise. 
 However, we should put in context the programme motion and the consultation process as a whole. The early parts of the process were a model—the review was set up on 27 June 1998 and reported just under two years later in March 2000. That review properly took a long time to confirm details, gather evidence and examine experiences around the world before coming forward with proposals for the Northern Ireland justice system. The Government considered the results of the review, and gave themselves more than 18 months before publishing the draft Bill and its implementation plan on 12 November last year. By comparison, the opportunities for parliamentary consideration have been somewhat telescoped. The Northern Ireland Assembly has come to the same conclusion. In the Ad Hoc Committee's report on the criminal justice review, it states that the Government was in violation of the Cabinet Office's guidelines on the consultation process. Its first recommendation, unanimously agreed by all the parties in the Assembly, is that the Northern Ireland Office should observe and comply with the Cabinet Office code of practice on written consultations when planning future written consultations.

Des Browne: This issue may not be the most important that the Committee will face, so I do not want to take up too much time. However, it is important to put the record straight regarding the length of consultation on the draft Bill. I, too, have read not just the recommendations of the Assembly's Ad Hoc Committee but the whole report, including all the submissions that were made to it. It is clear that the Committee and those who gave evidence to it wanted an extra four weeks beyond the consultation period that was announced when the Bill was published. As Minister, I acceded to that request during the consultation period and extended it by four weeks, precisely as requested.

Crispin Blunt: I acknowledge that the Minister generously extended the period by four weeks, over the Christmas period. As he says, that is a matter of record. The Assembly's conclusion seems to be that it would have preferred the Government to abide by Cabinet Office guidelines and allow at least three months for the process to take place. The Minister should recognise--as should the Committee in considering the programme motion--that the process of deliberation, having started in a thoroughly welcome fashion, has been telescoped now that parliamentarians are considering the proposals—first the Northern Ireland Assembly's Ad Hoc Committee
 and now this House of Commons Committee. The programme motion approved by the House, which sets a deadline of 14 February 2002 for the conclusion of our proceedings, is objectionable and regrettable, given the way in which the Government embarked on this process. It is wholly unnecessary to engage the ire of Opposition parties in this way, given that the Government were following a model process until legislators started to become involved.
 It is no excuse to say that because extensive consultation has taken place, there is no need for members of the House of Commons and members of the Assembly—those tiresome politicians—to animadvert on these matters. The Government's argument is that they have listened to lots of other people, apart from politicians, and that although politicians enjoy a democratic mandate, that does not matter because those other people are much more important than elected politicians. That principle is objectionable, and the reason why we have such concern about the programme motion. 
 I was grateful for the Minister's reply to my intervention about the legislative programme, which is the driver of this motion. I thought that the Government had some practical problem in that the Bill had to go to the House of Lords in time for their Lordships to give it proper consideration, but that does not seem to be the case. The Minister is working to the deadline of May 2003, when the Assembly elections will take place. This parliamentary Session will come to an end in October this year, and I had anticipated that by that time the Bill would become law. The Minister may have a problem if it is not law by then, but we are all formally working to that deadline, which meets his need to get the legislation on to the statute book. Therefore, there is no need to race the Bill through without giving it proper consideration in both Houses. 
 That brings me to the detail of the programme motion. It is objectionable enough for the Government to set a deadline of 14 February. We accept the Government's assurances that they will permit extra time for the Committee stage, should it prove necessary, although that is dependent on the Government's judgment about the Opposition's good behaviour in the proceedings. However, given the powers that the Government have given themselves under the Standing Orders of the House, they know that all their amendments will be considered at the end of the Committee's proceedings—at 5 o'clock on Thursday 14 February 2002, if they have not already been dealt with—so it is utterly objectionable for them to put knives into the programme. It is not possible for the Opposition even to make an intelligent decision about the pace at which the Bill will be considered. 
 The Minister also said that there would be no surprises in the legislation so the debate would not need to be extended. I sincerely hope that the legislation will include a surprise because, on Second Reading, the Secretary of State said:
 ''Another subject on which we have received a number of submissions is community safety. There was widespread support in the local government sector for a provision in the Bill to give councils clear statutory authority to undertake community safety work. I very much welcome the councils' intention to play an active role in community safety, which will contribute to reducing crime and the fear of crime in their localities. In order to facilitate that, I am minded, subject to consultation with the Northern Ireland Executive, to bring forward an amendment on those lines.'' —[Official Report, 21 January 2002; Vol. 378, c. 646.] 
We have not seen that amendment yet, but it will make substantial changes to the Bill, and will be an important part of our discussions. Community safety is of particular concern because of the loaded meaning of the word ''community'' in the Northern Ireland context. 
 The programme motion is extremely regrettable. The official Opposition believe that the knives should be removed. Our amendment would remove the knives and allow the Committee to consider the Bill without the pressure of the Government timetable.

Derek Conway: I remind the Committee, in case other hon. Members want to contribute to this debate, that six political parties are represented in the Committee and we can discuss the programme motion for only half an hour. I hope that that will be borne in mind.

Patsy Calton: I, too, welcome you to the Chair, Mr. Conway. My hon. Friend the Member for Montgomeryshire (Lembit Öpik) apologises to you and to the Committee. He has been detained in another meeting and will be here shortly.
 We shall agree to the programme motion. We want a self-disciplined, restrained and sensible approach to our deliberations. I am particularly pleased that the programme motion allows a fair amount of time for discussion of the later parts, particularly part 4 and the provisions on youth conferences.

Derek Conway: The hon. Member for Reigate (Mr. Blunt) has proposed an amendment, which is in order.
 Question put, That the amendment be made:--
The Committee divided: Ayes 7, Noes 16.

Question accordingly negatived. 
 Main Question put and agreed to. 
 Resolved, 
 That — 
 (1) during proceedings on the Justice (Northern Ireland) Bill the Standing Committee do meet on Tuesdays at half-past Ten o'clock and at half-past Four o'clock and on Thursdays at half-past Nine o'clock and at half-past Two o'clock; 
 (2) the proceedings shall be taken in the following order, namely Clauses 1 and 2, Schedule 1, Clause 3, Schedule 2, Clauses 4 and 5, Schedule 3, Clauses 6 to 11, Schedule 4, Clauses 12 and 13, Schedule 5, Clauses 14 to 20, Schedule 6, Clauses 21 and 22, New Clauses and New Schedules relating to Part 1, Clauses 23 to 29, Schedule 7, Clauses 30 to 44, New Clauses and New Schedules relating to Part 2, Clause 45, Schedule 8, Clauses 46 to 50, Schedule 9, Clauses 51 and 52, New Clauses and New Schedules relating to Part 3, Clauses 53 to 62, Schedule 10, Clause 63, Schedule 11, Clauses 64 and 65, New Clauses and New Schedules relating to Part 4, Clauses 66 to 80, New Clauses and New Schedules relating to Part 5, Clauses 81 to 83, Schedule 12, Clause 84, Schedule 13, Clauses 85 to 91 and remaining New Clauses and New Schedules; 
 (3) the proceedings on Clauses 1 and 2, Schedule 1, Clause 3, Schedule 2, Clauses 4 and 5, Schedule 3, Clauses 6 to 11, Schedule 4, Clauses 12 and 13, Schedule 5, Clauses 14 to 20, Schedule 6, Clauses 21 and 22 and New Clauses and New Schedules relating to Part 1 (so far as not previously concluded) shall be brought to a conclusion at 11.25 a.m on Thursday 31st January 2002; 
 (4) the proceedings on Clauses 23 to 29, Schedule 7, Clauses 30 to 44 and New Clauses and New Schedules relating to Part 2 (so far as not previously concluded) shall be brought to a conclusion at 7 p.m. on Tuesday 5th February 2002; 
 (5) the proceedings on Clause 45, Schedule 8, Clauses 46 to 50, Schedule 9, Clauses 51 and 52, New Clauses and New Schedules relating to Part 3, Clauses 53 to 62, Schedule 10, Clause 63, Schedule 11, Clauses 64 and 65 and New Clauses and New Schedules relating to Part 4 (so far as not previously concluded) shall be brought to a conclusion at 1 p.m. on Tuesday 12th February 2002; 
 (6) the remaining proceedings on the Bill (so. far as not previously concluded) shall be brought to a conclusion at 5 p.m. on Thursday 14th February 2002.

Derek Conway: Copies of the financial resolution relating to the Bill are available in the Room. I remind hon. Members that adequate notice of amendments should be given to the Clerk of the Committee. As a general rule, my co-Chairman and I do not intend to call starred amendments.Clause 1 Guarantee of continued judicial independence

Clause 1 - Guarantee of continued judicial independence

Seamus Mallon: I beg to move amendment No. 80, in page 1, line 6, leave out 'continued'.
 I, too, welcome you to the Chair, Mr. Conway. No doubt your briskness will rub off on us—or I hope and trust that it will. 
 This amendment is not the most serious or important that the Committee will consider, but it touches a chord. The use of the word ''continued'' in the first line of the Bill poses a question. It is included in the Bill without any reference to the review or without seeming to derive from it. That implies a certain attitude. One assumes that the administration 
 of justice is always impartial and just, so that word is superfluous. I believe that it is superfluous. For that reason, it is right that we should examine the matter at this initial stage. 
 I do not have to point out that the independence of the judiciary is emphasised in the European convention on human rights, which recognises the right to be heard by an independent and impartial tribunal. I therefore welcome the criminal justice review recommendation that 
''primary Westminster legislation should make explicit reference to the requirement for an independent judiciary and place a duty on the organs of government to uphold and protect that independence.'' 
The principle underlying clause 1 is eminently sound, but I have two concerns regarding its implementation. The amendment addresses the first of my concerns, and relates to the use of the word ''continued''. The review, it is noticeable, did not recommend that that word be included. The word was never used in the review, for good reason. That can hardly have been accidental, given the nature of the Bill and the controversy surrounding the system of justice and law in Northern Ireland during the many decades since the state was formed. 
 The use of the word ''continued'' poses questions for all of us. It is especially important because we are discussing a new beginning, not just for the criminal justice system and the political process in Northern Ireland, but for policing. It is a new attitude to life. If we retain that word, we will, by implication, be trawling something from the past and carrying it into what we envisage for the future. It is superfluous. Whether or not the judiciary was independent in the past is a matter for debate, but it is irrelevant to my point. If the judiciary had been fully independent, would we now be dealing with a Bill of this nature and size? 
 The amendment is not the most important one that we will consider, but if we are starting on something new and dealing with something that looks to the future, rather than harking back to the past, the use of ''continued'' is superfluous. It is also pejorative about the past, and perhaps we should try to dispel such attitudes. I commend the amendment to the Committee.

Crispin Blunt: I listened carefully to the hon. Gentleman. I am glad that he acknowledges that it is not the most serious amendment that we will consider, and I hope that that means that he will not press it. The effect of the amendment and its implications would be regarded with the utmost seriousness by the people at whom it is aimed—the members of the judiciary.
 The judiciary in Northern Ireland has discharged its responsibilities with the utmost heroism during the past 33 years. A number of its members have been murdered. They have required permanent protection from the threats of murderers, and they have had to move home. They have not only had to suffer the constant physical presence of people to protect them, but have had substantial changes made to their whole way of life in order to sustain a judicial function in Northern Ireland.
 No one examining the judicial record in Northern Ireland during the past 33 years, whichever side of the argument they come from, could regard the judiciary as having been ''on their side''. The fate of the evidence from the supergrasses is a case in point. In that instance, the judiciary acted in a way that caused massive inconvenience for the forces of law and order who were fighting terrorists and murderers in Northern Ireland. 
 I sincerely hope that the hon. Gentleman will reflect on what his amendment would actually mean for those who are its targets, and will withdraw it. I see it as a gratuitous insult to the record of the judiciary. The way in which they have carried out their function in terrible circumstances is beyond reproach.

Lady Hermon: I, too, welcome you to the Committee, Mr. Conway. I am delighted to see you here this morning.
 I take exception to the implication of the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Newry and Armagh (Mr. Mallon). I, too, would like to see it withdrawn for various reasons. First, I listened carefully to what the hon. Gentleman said, and he did not produce a shred of evidence to show that the independence of the judiciary has been called into question. 
 Secondly, if the hon. Gentleman had examined some of the research papers behind the review, he would have come across an interesting document on judicial appointments and training. It is significant, because it pays tribute to the courage, integrity and independence of the judiciary during the past 30 years, which we cast aside at our peril. It states: 
 ''Over the past 30 years the role of the judiciary in Northern Ireland has been influenced by the political situation. Judges have been considered a 'legitimate target' and they have been surrounded by constant security. There have been five members of the judiciary murdered (one Supreme Court Judge, two County Court judges, two Resident Magistrates) as well as the wife of a judge and the daughter of a Resident Magistrate. Five members of the judiciary have been injured, including a Lord Chief Justice; two Resident Magistrates; one County Court Judge (seriously injured); and one Resident Magistrate (seriously wounded in a gun attack which killed his daughter). There have been a total of 18 terrorist attacks made against members of the judiciary and virtually all have been intimidated or received threats. There have been 114 attacks on court buildings and most have suffered damage...These security considerations provide a frightening disincentive for potential judicial appointees in Northern Ireland.'' 
The amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Newry and Armagh is contemptible because of what it implies, and I urge him to withdraw it.

Edward Garnier: May I, along with those who have already spoken, welcome you to the Committee, Mr. Conway. I remember you as a fair Whip, and I trust that I shall enjoy your fairness in the Committee. I also congratulate the Minister—without undue flattery—on his appointment. This is the first time that I have had the chance to fence with him in Committee since he became a Minister. As a Back Bencher, he performed extremely well in debates in the Committee considering the International Criminal
 Court Bill, and it was clear that he would not be long in moving from the Back Benches to the Front Bench. I did not appreciate then that I would be moving from the Front Bench to the Back Benches, but life is full of surprises.
 I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate and the hon. Member for North Down (Lady Hermon) that we should try to persuade the hon. Member for Newry and Armagh to withdraw the amendment. It begins our deliberations on an unnecessarily contentious note. We have had our little dance about the programme motion, and that is probably enough. It is important to remember what we are about, which is to introduce a judicial and justice system for Northern Ireland that suits the circumstances of the Province, which I hope will remain firmly within the United Kingdom. 
 The United Kingdom judiciary—I include the judiciary of Northern Ireland—is famous worldwide for its independence of politics, and its freedom from political persuasion and cajolement by Government. As the hon. Member for North Down showed with her catalogue of victims, it has remained independent despite the terrorist onslaught that has been visited upon it. When I was working for Sir Nicholas Lyall, the Conservative Attorney-General, who was also Attorney-General for Northern Ireland, I came to a distinct understanding of the quality of the judiciary in Northern Ireland, of its fierce independence and of its appreciation of its duties, which it had to carry out under difficult circumstances in very troubled times. 
 I know that the hon. Member for Newry and Armagh means no ill will towards the current and previous holders of judicial office in Northern Ireland. He may be engaging in a debating point, but I wish that he would not because the implication of the amendment is unfortunate, to say the least. He has run his flag halfway up the mast. I urge him to pull it down again so that we can get on to the meat of the Bill.

Des Browne: I am grateful to all hon. Members for their acceptance of the principle that underlies the clause—including my hon. Friend the Member for Newry and Armagh. He has been reminded at least twice that it is not the most important amendment, but it is one of those amendments that resulted from the extensive consultation exercise, and it comes as no surprise.
 I thank the hon. and learned Member for Harborough (Mr. Garnier) for his kind words. I remember with pleasure our debates in Committee on the International Criminal Court Bill. If our debates in this Committee are of the same quality, we shall be satisfied. I do not share the hon. and learned Gentleman's view that the amendment would necessarily generate the contention or distaste that has been attributed to it. My hon. Friend went to great lengths to make it clear that he was not expressly criticising the independence of any of the current judiciary in Northern Ireland, nor did I hear him utter a word of criticism of any previous members. My experience of him is not as extensive as that of some other members of the Committee, but I know that he is no shrinking violet, and if he had something to say 
 on the subject he would have said it. Therefore, I suspect that he was not criticising the judiciary and did not intend to do so, but he can speak for himself. 
 It is helpful to have this opportunity to address constructively some areas of contention in the Bill. Some divisions of opinion may be strongly expressed, but I hope that we do so without descending to the level of criticism that has dogged some of the politics of Northern Ireland in the past. 
 I am grateful to my hon. Friend for introducing the amendment, although he will not be surprised if I try to persuade him to withdraw it. If he does not do so, I shall urge the Committee to resist it. 
 The Bill requires those with responsibility for the administration of justice to uphold the continued independence of the judiciary. On a plain reading of the review, that is its recommendation, which it made simply because of the paramount importance of an independent judiciary. Clearly, the reference to the 
''continued independence of the judiciary'' 
implies that the judiciary is currently independent. 
 I listened carefully to what my hon. Friend said about making a new start and the dangers of dragging in some of the history of the administration of justice in Northern Ireland. I do not reject his basic sentiment that this is an opportunity for a fresh start, but removing the reference to ''continuing'' independence would imply that the serving judiciary and those who have served in those posts in the past are or were not independent. I do not know whether that is his intention, but the implication is completely untrue and should be resisted. For those reasons, the word ''continued'' should be retained. 
 I hope that my hon. Friend will be persuaded to withdraw the amendment. We have debated the issues and he has had an opportunity to air his views, to which all members of the Committee listened with care.

Patsy Calton: I come to the issue as a complete newcomer to the ways of Northern Ireland. In the past few weeks and months, I have learnt that the nuances of meaning that are attributed to words, and the insertion and removal of words, have massive implications. I do not believe that there is any intention to insult the judiciary or to forget the past and the risks that they took. I ask the Committee to consider what ''continued'' will mean in 10, 20 or 50 years. In 50 years, it will be superfluous.
 I am not a lawyer, and I realise that I am among lawyers, but in my view the law is made up of words that must have a meaning for more than just the present. They must have a meaning for the future, as well. Therefore, in my view, the elimination of the word ''continued'' is sensible, and the Liberal Democrats will support the amendment.

Seamus Mallon: I have noted with great interest some of the reactions to this legitimate amendment in the context of a Bill of this nature. I should like to deal with some of the points that have been made.
 The hon. Member for North Down said that I did not produce a shred of evidence against any member of the judiciary. That is true, because I made no accusation against any member of the judiciary. Nor did I make a criticism of any of them. Because I made no accusation, criticism or implication, I felt no necessity to produce evidence, or to attempt to do so. 
 I was reminded that five members of the judiciary in Northern Ireland were murdered. That is correct. I knew three of them very well. I counted them as friends, and still do. It would be far from me, at this point of remove, to make implications about those three, about any other members of the judiciary who are murdered, or about any other serving members. That is not what the amendment says. The real implication is in the wording. I shall respond to the views of hon. Members, and I shall withdraw the amendment lest there be even a suspicion that there is an implication. However, let me ask the Committee whether, if the Bill related to Scotland, England or Wales, the sentence would read: 
''those with responsibility for the administration of justice must uphold the independence of the judiciary.''
 If we ask ourselves that question, would that not be the sentence? The reason for its inclusion is the suggested implication. If the Bill applied to Wales, would it not read as I hoped to amend it to read? I believe that it would. I am not a lawyer, like the hon. Member for Cheadle (Mrs. Calton), who spoke previously, but I believe that it is much more pristine as it is written. So be it. 
 While we are dealing with Northern Ireland we shall always have residues of difficulty. The hon. Lady was right to ask what the wording would be in 10 or 15 years' time? It is a valid point. I withdraw the amendment, although I think that it was right to table it, because there is a message for all of us in the very first line of the Bill. Perhaps I can, as kindly as I may, say that part of that message, in debates such as those that we shall have on this Bill, is that we shall have feelings about the issues. There will, of necessity, be raw nerves, and that will be understandable. If something as devoid of implication as this—and something that has had an amendment tabled to it that points to the future, not the past—touches nerves to the extent that we have seen, I hope that as we go further down the road we listen to one another and regard views as genuine, whatever feelings may be.

Lady Hermon: I appreciate the hon. Gentleman's remarks. Although he spoke only to the lead amendment, I have looked at amendment No. 81, which has not received comment this morning. It uses words such as:
 ''The judiciary shall decide matters''—

Derek Conway: Order. It might help the hon. Lady to know that we shall reach that amendment in due course and that hers is an intervention, not a contribution, so it must be directed at the hon. Member for Newry and Armagh.

Seamus Mallon: I thank the hon. Lady for her comments and look forward to hearing the point about amendment No. 81.
 I conclude on the note on which I hoped the debate would begin. There are no implications, and I should not like there to be any, for people whom I know, who are friends and who have been killed in their duty of carrying out their responsibility under the judiciary. I believe that the process of law and legislation is strong enough to rely on a statement that says, 
 ''Those with responsibility for the administration of justice must uphold the independence of the judiciary.'' 
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Crispin Blunt: I beg to move amendment No. 1, in page 1, line 6, after 'judiciary', insert 'and the legal profession'.
 I preface my remarks by thanking my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough for his contribution. I am embarrassed that our positions have swapped since we were with the Minister on the International Criminal Court Bill.

Edward Garnier: My hon. Friend need not be embarrassed; our positions have not swapped. He has a political post as an Opposition spokesman on Northern Ireland. I lived in a world of my own as a shadow Law Officer. I may still live in a world of my own, but he is still doing an important job.

Crispin Blunt: I am enormously grateful, and delighted that my hon. and learned Friend is on the Committee because he is the only lawyer among Her Majesty's Official Opposition. I hope that I do not misrepresent my hon. Friends the Members for Isle of Wight (Mr. Turner) and for Rayleigh (Mr. Francois) by suggesting that they do not have legal qualifications.
 I hope that the amendment will be uncontentious. On the face of it, the evidence for it is overwhelming and has convinced a wide body of opinion that it should be accepted. While doing preparatory work for the Bill in Northern Ireland, I was struck by the force of the case for the amendment—or for one along similar lines—by the Law Society of Northern Ireland. In repeated submissions, it said: 
 ''The safeguarding of human rights standards is not just a matter of judicial independence nor (in the specific context of the criminal justice system) of an independent prosecutorial structure. The existence of a genuinely independent legal profession is vital in the protection of human rights, not only in so far as this involves the framing of just laws and procedures but also in the robust and independent application and defence of those laws and procedures.'' 
That point was made to me forcibly, not only in writing but directly by Alan Hewitt, the president of the Law Society of Northern Ireland, and John Baillie, the chief executive. It is a strong recommendation of the Law Society, which was endorsed by Eilish McDermott of the Bar Council when I went to see her, that that should appear in the Bill. 
 The form of words for an amendment suggested by the Law Society of Northern Ireland was: 
 ''Those with responsibility for the administration of justice must uphold the continued independence of the legal profession''.
Rather than include in the Bill a separate amendment about the legal profession, it seemed sensible simply to link the judiciary and the legal profession together. 
 The case behind the amendment did not come just from the Law Society, but arose from the review group that reported in March 2000. Paragraph 3.53 of that report says: 
 ''Principle 16 of the Basic Principles''— 
the United Nations' basic principles on the role of lawyers— 
''also provides that governments shall ensure that lawyers are able to perform all of their professional functions without intimidation, hindrance, harassment or improper interference. In his report on his mission to the United Kingdom in 1998, the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, Mr. Param Cumaraswamy, expressed particular concern about the fact that lawyers in Northern Ireland who had represented those accused of terrorist offences had been subjected to intimidation, harassment or improper interference, and had been identified with their clients or with their clients' causes. The Special Rapporteur welcomed the Northern Ireland Law Society's decision to establish a complaints procedure to enable solicitors to complain to the Society about any agency within either the criminal or civil justice system which had allegedly impugned or threatened their independence, professionalism and integrity.'' 
The review concluded from that, and I agree with the conclusion: 
 ''We agree with the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers that government has a responsibility to provide the machinery for an effective and independent investigation of all threats made against lawyers''. 
In their plan for implementation of the criminal justice review, the Government acknowledge the special role of defence lawyers and say that they accept recommendation 9 of the review. 
 There is a climate within which the Law Society, the Bar Council and the review by implication uphold the necessity to protect the independence of the legal profession, and acknowledge the problems that there have been with the legal profession in Northern Ireland, not least over lawyers and clients being seen as too close together. Accusations have been thrown around about the legal profession's role in Northern Ireland. It is therefore necessary to include this provision in the Bill. The Northern Ireland Assembly agrees with that, which should be the clincher for Committee members to accept the amendment. Any agreement that is reached in the Northern Ireland Assembly among parties ranging from—

Des Browne: I am very grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way in mid-sentence. I am conscious that the amendment arises from lobbying on behalf of the Law Society of Northern Ireland. I see the force of it and the relevance of paragraph 3.53 of the review, which I shall discuss in my response. However, will he apply his mind to the issue of the regulation of both branches of the legal profession in the light of his amendment? What are its implications for the regulation of a profession that is at present self-regulated?

Crispin Blunt: I sincerely hope that self-regulation will be able to continue. The duty being placed on those responsible for the administration of justice in the clause is the upholding of the independence of the judiciary, and the amendment only adds the
 independence of the legal profession. Such independence is a duty placed on those responsible for the administration of justice. Members of the legal profession, especially in their responsibilities as officers of the court, also have a duty to the court. My proposal is at the request of the Law Society and the Bar Council. I am sure that they would not want this in the Bill if they thought that the Government would find it necessary to propose a mass of regulations. I look forward to hearing what the Minister thinks the consequences of the amendments might be. I had certain consequences in mind when I tabled the amendment.

Des Browne: I thank the hon. Gentleman for making it clear that what may be unintended consequences are not the ones that he had in mind. His amendment is not restricted to the circumstances that are discussed in paragraph 3.53 of the report, or to solicitors, barristers or officers of the court. It is an all-inclusive application of a requirement on certain bodies in relation to currently self-regulated professions.

Crispin Blunt: Those professions rightly see themselves as independent. If they want their independence to be protected in law, as the amendment would ensure, the Bill should give them that independence. All parties in Northern Ireland share my conclusion. The Northern Ireland Assembly's Ad Hoc Committee report on the draft Justice (Northern Ireland) Bill and the criminal justice review implementation plan highlighted paragraphs 50 and 51 of the Law Society's evidence. It concluded in recommendation 2:
 ''That a new clause be inserted which acknowledges and safeguards the continuing independence and impartiality of the legal profession.'' 
I look forward with interest to hearing the Minister's reply, as the professions and all parties in Northern Ireland request the insertion of a new clause, as do the Opposition. 
 If there was a genuine consultation process, this must have been an oversight, or perhaps the matter was not considered in those terms. The review group did not conclude that an assertion about the independence of the legal profession was wrong or improper. It set down duties with regard to the independence of the prosecutorial system, as well as the judiciary, which appear later in the Bill. It strikes me as odd that there is not a duty on those who administer justice to sustain the independence of the legal profession. It had not occurred to me that there were significant arguments against such independence, which the Minister's interventions imply. 
 I look forward to the debate on the issues relating to my amendment, which I will withdraw if the Minister can convince the Committee that I should do so. However, I hope that he will agree to the amendment, given the consensus in the professions and the Opposition, and especially in the Northern Ireland Assembly, that these matters should be devolved.

Lembit Öpik: I apologise for my slight lateness, but sitting in the meeting that delayed me gave me something to look forward to for the rest of the day.
 The sentiment expressed by the hon. Member for Reigate is consistent with what the various bodies that he described have called for. The issue of concern to me is not one of strategy. It is appropriate for us to explore the intention to support what, for the sake of simplicity, is being called the independence of not only the judiciary but all those involved in the administration of justice, including the legal profession. However, my concern is with the specific wording. The definition of ''independence'' could be different outside the Committee. The hon. Member for Reigate suggested a definition such as ''a profession whose practitioners see themselves as independent'', but the difficulty is that a lawyer could have a field day with any definition of ''independence''. 
 The Minister will no doubt return to the point, but the big question that the hon. Gentleman may be able to address in his summating speech is how self-regulation alone can be a sufficient tool for those responsible for the administration of justice in Northern Ireland to ensure that the legal profession is maintained independently. Self-regulation would probably work until there was a significant example of when it failed or the legal profession acted non-independently. History tells us that at such a moment huge pressure is put on a Government to shift from self to mandatory regulation. I am not a great fan of such a shift—generally in society we go too far towards mandatory regulation—and the amendment would enshrine that responsibility on the Government. We would be providing in law that the Government should seriously consider mandatory regulation of the legal profession if they were not confident that they could maintain its independence in any other way. 
 Therefore, my question to the hon. Gentleman is not about intent, but about definition. How could the definition of ''independence'' be codified so that it would not be up for legal challenge, and how does he respond to my concern that a Government might be under enormous pressure to create a mandatory regulatory structure in the event of a failure of the independence of the legal profession?

Edward Garnier: I intervene just to persuade the Minister that his intervention on my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate, although interesting to hear, revealed a non-point. It is a non-point particularly when it comes from the mouth of a representative of a Government who intervened on the legal profession with the Access to Justice Act 1999, even though he was not a Minister at the time. As a former full-time lawyer, I am sure that he is concerned about the independence of the legal profession and that, like me, he will have been dismayed about the passage of that legislation. Although called the Access to Justice Act, it stripped away access and was more of a denial to justice Act, and I trust that when we get back into Government, we will do something about it. It was a wholesale intervention on the independence of the legal profession.
 At first blush, my hon. Friend's amendment appears to be outside the terms of the long title of the Bill, which is: 
 ''A Bill to make provision about the judiciary in Northern Ireland''. 
To that extent, it seems that it would be ultra vires the Bill to make provisions about the legal profession, but my hon. Friend has in fact lighted upon an extremely important point. Like me, he knows that we cannot have an independent judiciary unless it can rely on an independent legal profession. The judiciary in the United Kingdom is exclusively taken from the legal profession, and one reason why our court system works in Northern Ireland, Scotland, England and Wales is because of the mutual understanding and bond of trust between those who act as advocates and those who sit in judgment. That trust is brought about by working together because judges, having been either solicitors or barristers themselves, know the people who appear before them. That is increasingly difficult in the large legal profession of England and Wales, but in Northern Ireland, as in Scotland, the legal profession is still relatively small and knows itself well. Any judge is likely to know or know of, with a good level of understanding, the character and merits of advocates appearing in front of him or her. The judge will rely on the good standing and independence of the advocate to assess whether the submissions and arguments he or she makes are honest and soundly based. The advocate may in due course become a judge. Those who appoint judges from the legal profession will know whether candidates are suited to become judges, by possessing not only the necessary intellectual capacity but also a character that allows them to perform the job with considerable independence. 
 I should declare an interest as the current Lord Chancellor kindly appointed me to the bench as a recorder in 2000. I am not making a party political point; I am making a point about the vital importance of maintaining not only an independent judiciary but also an independent legal profession on which the judiciary so much relies. I know from my own experience of sitting in the Crown courts just across from Parliament square in the Middlesex Guildhall that my job as a judge is made so much easier because I can trust that, by and large, the barristers and solicitor advocates who appear in front of me are straight, will not lie to the court and will not advance a dishonest submission based on made-up facts. They act in that way because it is their duty to do so, but also because it is inculcated into them from their student days and their pupillage—I have forgotten the modern term for doing articles. It is a sort of unspoken handing down of the culture from generation to generation that can be learnt only by experience, not by reading about it in books. If we do not understand the necessary relationship between the training of lawyers and the reliance that the judiciary places on them, we will make huge mistakes in the administration of justice, not only in Northern Ireland but in the rest of the United Kingdom.
 I applaud the amendment. It is hugely important as a matter of fact and as a matter of symbolism. I do not see in it the pitfalls that the Minister implied in his intervention on my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate. The Law Society and the Bar Council of Northern Ireland can remain fiercely and proudly independent bodies that uphold the highest standards of the law and can continue to regulate themselves in matters of discipline. However, no profession is wholly independent of the law. Members of the legal profession in the United Kingdom are subject to the discipline of the criminal law. If they commit crimes outside or within their profession they will be prosecuted if the evidence exists to justify doing so. Equally, if a judge believes that an advocate appearing in front of him or her is committing a professional or a criminal offence, he or she will take steps to deal with that person, by reporting the matter to the leader of the Bar Council of Northern Ireland or to the president of the Law Society of Northern Ireland or, if necessary and the evidence warrants it, to the police or the relevant prosecuting authority. 
 There is no absolute independence in the sense implied by the Minister. No contradiction will affect the Bill by the addition of the words proposed by my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate. Rather there will be an underlining of the symbiotic relationship between the judiciary and the legal profession, which makes our courts cleaner and more widely respected. That is essential for a part of the United Kingdom that has seen huge difficulties between the two communities. 
 I speak with diffidence because I have not lived in Northern Ireland since the 1950s, though I have listened to people such as the hon. Member for Newry and Armagh and other Northern Ireland MPs—and visited the Province subsequently. Where it is difficult to maintain law and order generally, the independence of the legal profession and of the judiciary should go hand in hand and be afforded statutory recognition. 
 I urge the Minister to view the amendment kindly. If he is dissatisfied with the drafting, he will doubtless say so and draw on the expertise of his officials, who might be able to improve it. I am not convinced, however, that the amendment can be improved. It makes sense, and coincides with the realities and the proper needs and expectations of the ordinary men and women of Northern Ireland, who rely on an independent legal profession to protect their civil rights. It also protects the judiciary, as we saw in debating the earlier amendment. The judiciary comes from the legal profession and its fierce independence relies on the quality of the legal profession before it. 
 I have unnecessarily extended these simple points with an over-wordy intervention, but I hope that the Minister will find some merit in these remarks in support of my hon. Friend.

Seamus Mallon: In tabling the amendment, the hon. Member for Reigate has done a service to the Committee at this early stage. The amendment raises a crucial point and I listened carefully to what the hon.
 and learned Member for Harborough said about it. It is almost unique to hear someone of such standing in the legal profession explain that its importance lies in the fact that it is the only bulwark—in respect of the process of law—for the ordinary man and woman on the street. It is not just a lawyers' discussion about how best the legal profession should be catered for. It goes to the heart of how we, the legislators, create law and subsequently hand it to the judiciary and the legal profession to sustain as a means of protecting the individual.
 The amendment is crucial and welcome, particularly at these early stages, as I said. Many views about the legal profession are expressed. Whether we are talking about judges, solicitors or barristers, they deal with what we hand them to protect us and maintain order in society. I accept that the lay person requires some definition of the word, ''independence''. People readily understand that the legal profession is expected to--and, by and large, does--behave with integrity. Its members work to the highest standards and, as the hon. and learned Member for Harborough said, are straight and deal properly with the law and with the public. I look forward to hearing a definition of the word ''independence''. It is important, because it may allow us to recognise the benefit of the amendment.

Des Browne: In response to the hon. Member for Reigate praying in aid the support from several sources for the principle behind the amendment, I will be impressed if proposals that come before the Committee have that level of support and—this is important—when tested, are seen to be practical, operative and capable of improving the justice system in Northern Ireland. I wish to make several comments about the importance of that to the amendment.
 The all-party Assembly Ad Hoc Committee and the Opposition have accepted the recommendation of the Law Society of Northern Ireland. However, I have no sense that anyone has done anything other than accept it in the broadest principle. It is not tested in any of the documents that I have read. 
 Late last night, to prepare for today's Committee, I read again the evidence given by the Law Society of Northern Ireland to the Assembly's Ad Hoc Committee on 29 November. It was instructive to read it because, although the issue occupies a substantial part of the evidence, the questioning needs questioning; the hon. and learned Member for Harborough will recognise that. The questions were asked by people who knew the answers that they would get; in fact, some of the questions included the answers. They knew exactly what the Law Society's position is from the written submission, and no one asked, for example, for a definition of independence. 
Mr. Garnier rose—

Des Browne: I shall allow the hon. and learned Gentleman to speak in a moment.
 How does the definition differ from that for independence of the judiciary? Later, I shall deal with some of the problems arising from that. No one asked the question that I pose: what will be the consequences of self-regulation of both branches of the profession in 
 Northern Ireland? I did not say in my intervention that they must give up self-regulation. The hon. and learned Gentleman spoke about self-regulation in relation to discipline, but self-regulation of both branches of the profession in Northern Ireland, as in Scotland, England and Wales, covers substantially more than just discipline. 
 I served for eight years on the council of the Law Society of Scotland and know all about self-regulation and how jealously the legal profession has guarded it, for good reasons to do with their independence and their ability to serve the purposes that hon. Members articulated so ably in the debate. However, no one asked the Law Society of Northern Ireland about the implications of self-regulation, how it would be enforced or what framework would have to be in place in order for those with responsibility for the administration of justice to uphold the independence of the legal profession in any circumstances. I intervened because of that concern.

Edward Garnier: No one has asked the question posed by the Minister about the independence of the judiciary either. Having practised law in relatively peaceful parts of the United Kingdom, he and I take it for granted that the judiciary and both wings of the legal profession are independent and that it is right that the state, the courts and so on should uphold their independence.
 However, clause 1 is not something that one normally sees in a British Act of Parliament: it is an aspiration and a declaration of intention and will, not a specific provision. Given that fact, we are in different legislative territory. If an aspiration as to the independence of the judiciary is in the Bill, why should we not also put the legal profession on the shopping list of those to be protected by that aspiration?

Des Browne: I am grateful to the hon. and learned Gentleman for raising that point, because it allows me to try to explain why there is a difference. In the first instance—I know that this is not a complete answer—there is a distinction. Clause 1 states:
 ''Those with responsibility for the administration of justice must uphold the continued independence of the judiciary'', 
and of course the Government are included in the general description of those with responsibility for the administration of justice. That requirement was a recommendation by the review, and one can summarise the reason for that as the paramount nature of the independence of the judiciary. 
 However, the review made no such recommendation on the legal profession, despite the detail in which it considered aspects of that independence and made recommendations, particularly recommendation 9, following on from paragraph 3.53 of the review. 
 The Government propose the expression of an aspiration, accepting a duty on ourselves, and set out in further clauses specifically what we propose be put in place to guarantee the fulfilment of that aspiration as far as we are concerned. No such consequential 
 mechanism is spelt out or considered in relation to the Law Society of Northern Ireland, which is the principal proponent of the expression in the Bill. 
 Apart from that, no consideration is given to what independence means. The hon. Member for Montgomeryshire raised that important point. Those of us who have practised law and been involved with lawyers know that, to lawyers, it means something different from the independence of the judiciary. I accept that the concept operates in the same sphere and towards the same objectives, but it is different. In my view, that raises potentially tricky regulatory questions. 
 Let me give an example. What does independence mean in the context of solicitors who are working on litigation between two separate private sector clients? It is clearly not the same concept as the independence of a judge who may be called on to adjudicate on that litigation. The provision as drafted will have implications in that sphere.

Edward Garnier: I am sorry to contradict the Minister, but he is inventing a non-existent problem. In the context of two opponents on a piece of civil litigation, independence simply means that they are independent of improper pressure or influence. The two solicitors may be arguing over a point of discovery--whether a document should be disclosed to the other side. The lay client of the solicitor who has the document under discussion may not want his solicitor to send the document to the other side because it could undermine his case. However, because he is independent and possesses the qualities and characteristics that are required of an independent legal professional, the solicitor will say to his client, ''I am sorry, it is inconvenient, but the law requires me, in certain circumstances, to break the link with my client and to uphold my link with the justice system.''
 One does not need to list the categories of things that must be protected to undermine the argument that the legal profession should be independent and that independence should be upheld by those responsible for the administration of justice. It is rather like defining an elephant—elephants are easier to recognise than they are to describe. Just as the expression is used in relation to the judiciary, so it can and should be used in relation to the legal profession. 
 I do not see the difficulties that the Minister outlines; every lawyer knows what we are talking about, and every Member of Parliament ought to know. In the Northern Irish context, if it can be included in the Bill, as it is in relation to the judiciary, that is all well and good. I agree that it will not be fatal to the Bill or destroy the legal profession one way or the other, but if one is in the business of wish lists and of cataloguing who should be protected by those responsible for the administration of justice, surely the legal profession must be, if not first equal, at least a close second to the judiciary.

Des Browne: I am grateful to the hon. and learned Gentleman once again for trying not to define ''independence'', and thus being helpful to the Committee. It is sometimes helpful to the Committee to say that concepts such as independence are not necessarily improved by people's attempts to define them and that people can better recognise things and be more comfortable when they are not there than when they are.
 My argument against the amendment is that it has potential consequences for the regulation of the profession because it places a duty on the Government, who, I accept, have already regulated both professions. However, it is not an answer to the argument that we should explore its potential consequences to say that the Government have in the past introduced legislation that has regulated the profession. My argument is that until there is some clearer definition of what is meant by the profession in Northern Ireland in relation to the proposal, and until it is tested in relation to its potential consequences and those consequences are understood by everyone to be what the profession expects, the amendment presents a challenge that cannot be met in the context of the Bill. 
 The legal profession in Northern Ireland, especially the Law Society of Northern Ireland, advocates the inclusion of such an expression of intent in the Bill and I have on several occasions offered to meet them to discuss it. I understand that lawyers are busy and it may not have been possible to get the right people to discuss the matter with me until now. However, a meeting is planned; I have offered alternative dates and my officials have offered to meet the professions' representatives, but they have not found a convenient time. 
 The amendment sets an unpredictable precedent and I therefore hope that the Opposition spokesman will be—

Seamus Mallon: I am sorry for intruding. How would the Minister define, in the context of the Bill, those with responsibility for the administration of justice?

Des Browne: Principally, the Government have responsibility for the administration of justice. The Bill establishes the framework that will apply when responsibility for the administration of justice is partly devolved to the Administration and Assembly of Northern Ireland. Those are the people who will have that responsibility. I am not sure whether the Bill provides a clearer definition: I shall look further into it and mention it later in our proceedings.
 I hope that I have made the Government's view of the amendment clear. The Government object to nothing in the aims and objectives or in the principles of the profession articulated in our debate so far. We agree that aspirations should be set for the administration of justice. Having said that, and in the Bill's context, it makes sense to reduce those aspirations to a statutory expression because we may be entering an area that involves unpredictable consequences. Until those consequences are exhaustively examined, the Government will have to resist the amendment.

Crispin Blunt: Obviously, I am disappointed that our array of arguments has failed to convince the Minister, but I note that he has yet to see the Law Society for a discussion about his concerns. I do not share his concerns, also articulated by the hon. Member for Montgomeryshire, about the consequences for regulation. The answer lies in what the Minister said about his own experience on the Council of the Law Society of Scotland. He argued that self-regulation was important because the profession used it as a means of guarding its independence. The hon. Member for Montgomeryshire produced the test: what happens when a member of the legal profession has obviously not been independent? Will the Government then have to introduce a vast array of regulations to sustain the profession's independence?
 The whole Committee is agreed on the intention behind the amendment and the principle that the legal profession must be independent. Trying to define exactly what ''independence'' means causes the same difficulties faced by the Minister in trying to define all who have the responsibility for the administration of justice. Many people working for the Court Service in many different capacities have such a responsibility in sustaining the court system in Northern Ireland—or anywhere else, for that matter. Duties can be interpreted widely and people know what independence means.

Lembit Öpik: On the specific point about the definition of independence, two schools of thought appear to prevail. Some members of the Committee believe that it is unnecessary to pin a definition down; others feel that the matter represents an Achilles' heel in the amendment. What would happen if lawyers started suing each other in pursuit of a proper definition? I might lose a case and argue that my lawyer had not acted independently. Is that not a serious difficulty; will it not then be a duty to define independence more clearly?

Crispin Blunt: The hon. Gentleman would have restitution of those circumstances anyway within the framework in which people are able to make complaints against lawyers. In the end, people can take legal action against lawyers, and it is the profession that insists on protecting its independence within its own codes. That goes to the point of the only effective question on the consequences, which the hon. Gentleman asked. He asked what would happen if were there a problem: would the Government have to produce a vast raft of regulations to take over from the Law Society and Bar Council the responsibility for regulating their professions? The answer should be no, for all the reasons that the Minister made clear about the importance of the profession guarding its independence and the ability of self-regulation to do that.
 However, if it became clear that the professions were incapable of sustaining their independence or they were not exercising their functions independently, the Government would have to address the problem, whether through regulations or in other ways. That is precisely why the duty should appear in the Bill. If the 
 legal profession's independence were questioned, the Government would have to introduce regulations to re-establish it.

Edward Garnier: I will provide an example that may be helpful to my hon. Friend's argument; if it is not, he can reject it straightaway. Does he believe that, if we were considering the Justice (Zimbabwe) Bill and clause 1 were framed exactly as clause 1 of this Bill, the Government would not want to include the words ''and the legal profession''? I appreciate that the facts of life in Zimbabwe are wholly different from those in Northern Ireland, but I wonder whether my hon. Friend would find it helpful to use that as an example to illustrate the point that I tried to make in my over-lengthy and feeble intervention.

Crispin Blunt: I am extremely grateful to my hon. and learned Friend, because his point was helpful. It would be self-evident that, if one were trying to pass laws in the extreme example of Zimbabwe, one would be anxious to sustain and protect the independence of all parts of the judicial system as hard and fast as one could. One must wonder whether laws in Zimbabwe are terribly important to those who are responsible for the administration of justice under the current regime. However, before you call me to order, Mr. Conway, I should like to say that that is a separate issue which I do not intend to pursue further. However, the example was appropriate.
 The Minister's objections in trying to find consequences that flow from the amendment violate the common-sense use of language. People know what independence is and that the judiciary and legal profession should be independent. That point is not at issue. We know that the legal profession will jealously and properly guard its self-regulation, but in the circumstances of self-regulation going wrong, there will be a duty to put it right. I would not want to advocate that, because of the consequences that would flow from it. I note that the Minister will be meeting the Law Society, and I hope that he can clarify that that will happen before Report, because it is important. I am happy to take an intervention, because if he has the chance before Report to reflect on the amendment, meet the Law Society and take account of our discussion, I am prepared to withdraw the amendment to return to it on Report. If the Minister will not meet the Law Society before Report, I will press the issue now.

Des Browne: To my knowledge, we have offered 4 and 11 February as meeting dates, which will be when the Committee is still sitting. I am not sure whether those dates are convenient for Law Society representatives, but if the hon. Gentleman continues to speak I may get more information.

Crispin Blunt: I shall not speak for long because we should finish discussing the amendment and make progress. The Minister is facing a strong alliance.

Des Browne: I am told that the meeting has been agreed for 18 February, so neither 4 nor 11 February could have been accepted.

Crispin Blunt: The meeting with the Law Society will therefore presumably be before Report stage. I hope that, in deciding when to bring the Bill forward for Report and Third Reading, the Government business managers will take account of that meeting on 18 February, which should give the Minister time to bring forward the amendment in his own name, if he wants to do so as a consequence of the meeting. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Seamus Mallon: I beg to move amendment No. 81, in page 1, line 6, at end add—
 '( ) The judiciary shall decide matters before them impartially, on the basis of facts and in accordance with the law, without any restrictions, improper influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason'.
 I recognise that there will be reactions to the amendment, but I hope that they will not be overladen with accusations of non-existent implications. We have had an interesting debate in which it has become clear that a definition of line 1 of the Bill is required, on two counts: what is meant by those with responsibility for the administration of justice and by independence? Maybe it is naivety on my part or an overzealous desire to establish meaning, but I believe that we should try to define what is meant by the impartiality of the judiciary and the legal profession. 
 The amendment reads: 
 ''The judiciary shall decide matters before them impartially, on the basis of facts and in accordance with the law, without any restrictions, improper influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason''. 
That is clumsy and wordy, but it is accurate. No member of the Committee or anyone outside it could disagree with it in trying to arrive at a definition of impartiality. No one could quibble with any of those phrases or with the totality of them. However, I fear that there will be those who say that impartiality surely means what it says. I understand their position; from line 1 of the Bill, nothing in the Bill so far means what it says, because of the lack of definition. That is not unique. 
 The amendment is taken, almost word for word, from United Nations basic principles on the independence of the judiciary. It is, therefore, not based on any great inspiration on my part. It is clearly reflected in the basic principles of the United Nations. The definition would impose a duty of independence on the judiciary and the legal profession, and protect them from any attempt to encroach on their independence from any quarter. 
 That brings us to a point that was alluded to in a previous debate. Do we all believe that there are no tensions, and never will be, between the various parties described in the Bill who are responsible for the administration of justice? Will there never be times when strong tensions arise? Have there not been times over the past 30 years in Northern Ireland where great tensions have existed between those parties? If we honestly ask ourselves those questions, and are not 
 afraid to answer them, we must say that there will always be such tensions, especially unrest and violence. There will always be tension between the various strands of Government and the administration of justice. That is inevitable. Human nature and necessity demand it. Are we living in a world in which we say to ourselves that those tensions will never be there? They will always be there. 
 I could give examples, but I do not want to because of the inference that I am making a judgment about the past. Many members of the Committee know from what has happened more than once on the Floor of the House that those tensions exist. There is no such amorphous quality about those who are responsible for administering justice in this country, Northern Ireland or, indeed, Zimbabwe. Those tensions are the very nature of the way in which the entire political administrative system works. We should remove ourselves from the ivory tower where it is said that those tensions do not exist. They do, and they will. 
 There is enormous potential for other tensions in devolution and for making the administration of justice in Northern Ireland a function of a Northern Ireland Administration, while elements of security remain outside the responsibility of that devolved Administration. Those are but two of the ways in which more definition would not imply anything about the legal profession or the judiciary, but would reinforce the integrity of their position, and protect them. Those tensions are inevitable, because, however fair the wind blows in Northern Ireland, it will not blow away the residue of a bitter past in a short period.Would that it were different, but, if we are taking a new step and creating something for the future, let us do it in a way that will protect the capacity not just of the judiciary and legal profession but of the amorphous group known as 
 ''Those with responsibility for the administration of justice'' 
to act impartially. 
 I do not believe that there can be any quarrel with the wording of the amendment or its constituent phrases. The legislative draftsmanship may look, and probably is, clumsy. However, I would rather be clumsy and protect that which we seek to protect than be technically correct and leave gaps.

Edward Garnier: I have some sympathy with the remarks of the hon. Member for Newry and Armagh, but I wish to make two points; for once, I will be brief.
 First, if the wording is to come into the Bill at all, it would do better at clause 20(1), which states: 
 ''Every person appointed to an office specified in Schedule 6 must, before undertaking any functions of the office,'' 
either take the oath or make the affirmation. Would not the hon. Gentleman's wording do better if it were put between the words ''must'' and ''before'' in line 12? It would say that every person appointed to an office specified in schedule 6 must 
''decide matters before them impartially''— 
and so on— 
''before undertaking any functions.'' 
My second and more substantive point is that the amendment would not do any more than the proposed form of judicial oath or affirmation. All that the hon. 
 Gentleman wants is in clause 20(2) or (3). My hon. Friend the Member for Reigate and I have plenty to say about the new form of oath and the absence of an oath of allegiance, but that is a separate matter. The oath proposed by the Government at clause 20(2) adequately deals with the hon. Gentleman's concern, and it does so in a more concise form.

Seamus Mallon: I thank the hon. and learned Gentleman for his point, which is not without validity. I take his point about the oath. It is a mistake to believe that the law is for the legal profession or the judiciary. It is not; it is for us. It is for our protection and for the protection of society. The ordinary man or woman on the street, such as myself, can understand the amendment, phrase by phrase. I am not sure that the ordinary person knows the oath is taken by lawyers or that they would recognise within it that which will provide the protection that the amendment, however clumsy, would offer. I recognise the validity of the hon. and learned Gentleman's comment, but there is another point to be made.

Edward Garnier: The hon. Gentleman has a point to make and I am grateful that he does not think mine lacking in validity. The cliche is that if someone wants to keep a secret, they should make a speech in the House of Commons. I dare say that they could also write it into a Bill. Of course the wider general public will not study the Bill. Unless they are particularly sad, they will probably not read the Hansard of the Committee.
 A small group of people in Northern Ireland who are interested in the administration of justice will come to know of our discussion, but at the end of the day—to use that dreadful expression—the people of Northern Ireland are interested in the quality of justice that they receive or that is available to them as citizens of this country day by day. They are interested in the quality of the judiciary that sits in civil and criminal cases. 
 I may be wrong, but I have a suspicion that, when taken by judges, the judicial oath at clause 20—I am guessing, but I suspect that that form of the oath, as opposed to the one that my hon. Friends and I should like to see in the Bill, will go into law—will have the desired effect on them, if that is needed. Judges will sit impartially and will do their best 
''without fear or favour, affection or ill-will according to the laws and usages of this realm.'' 
In the words of the amendment, they will also 
''decide matters impartially, on the basis of facts and in accordance with the law, without any restrictions, improper influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason''. 
Surely both provisions come to the same thing. Judges will do their best, but they will do so just as much under the oath in clause 20 as they would have under the amendment. I am not saying that the hon. Gentleman is making a bad point—he made some very good points—but the law is already clumsy enough and Acts of Parliament are wordy enough. I do not wish to undermine the argument that we had a 
 moment ago, when I wanted to add three more words, but sometimes there is a line to be drawn. I suspect that the oath in clause 20 will be good enough.

Lady Hermon: As a comparative novice to Committee work, I apologise unreservedly for galloping ahead to amendment No. 81 while we were still discussing amendment No. 80, Mr. Conway. I also apologise unreservedly to the hon. Member for Newry and Armagh if I implied a criticism of him for not mentioning it.
 My point relates to the Human Rights Act 1998, which Committee members will be aware came into force throughout the United Kingdom. Interestingly, it came into force in Northern Ireland earlier—immediately on devolution. I think that that provision was tucked away in schedule 14 to the Northern Ireland Act 1998. The Human Rights Act makes it clear that all litigants are guaranteed a fair and independent trial. If ''restrictions, improper influences, inducements'' and the other points in the amendment impinge on the fairness or impartiality of a trial, there is already on the statute book a means whereby that decision or judgment can be challenged. The amendment is therefore superfluous. 
 The Bill proposes the devolution of justice and policing to the Northern Ireland Executive and Assembly, which shows confidence that they will continue. I am pleased about that. Again, under the Northern Ireland Act 1998, particularly section 24, the Assembly and every member of the Executive, all Ministers and all Departments are duty bound by their obligations under the European convention on human rights. Therefore, there should be no concern about the future Minister of Justice failing to comply with human rights obligations. The provision is already on the statute book in the form of the Northern Ireland Act 1998.

Seamus Mallon: That was not my point. In some circumstances, it would not be a matter for the Minister of Justice, who might have a problem. A tension could be created between a devolved Administration and the sovereign Administration regarding the various aspects of implementation. Both impinge on the administration of justice. It is a dangerous position. The hon. Lady is right about redress under human rights legislation, but the clause is not about redress; it is about imposing responsibility on people—''those with responsibility for'' the administration of justice. That is the essence of the clause.

Lady Hermon: I know that considerable time and expense have been invested in briefing the judiciary and members of the legal profession about the implications of the Human Rights Act. Those people are well aware of the need to guarantee a fair and independent trial. As it stands under existing legislation, the hon. Gentleman's concerns expressed in amendment No. 81 are already addressed, so the amendment is superfluous.

Des Browne: As has already been pointed out this morning, the Bill places a duty on those responsible for the administration of justice to uphold the independence of the judiciary. Let me be of more help on the definition of those responsible for it. It includes the Government here at Westminster and the Executive in Northern Ireland under devolved arrangements. As the hon. Member for Reigate said, it includes other agents of the state, such as the Police Service of Northern Ireland, the Department of Public Prosecution, the Probation Board for Northern Ireland, the Court Service and others who have responsibilities for the administration of justice. I hope that that helps my hon. Friend the Member for Newry and Armagh to understand what the term means.
 Clause 20 refers to an oath in which judges promise to do right by all manner of people ''without fear or favour''. I am grateful to the hon. Member for North Down for pointing out that the Northern Ireland Act 1998 brought the Human Rights Act 1998 into force in Northern Ireland in relation to devolved matters and institutions. That also applied in Scotland from 1 July 1999. Far from having to search in the Bill's schedules for a reference to it, we celebrate the fact that the Human Rights Act was at least partially in force in Scotland—and it has greatly benefited from it, despite what others suggested might happen. 
 The amendment covers all the ground again in language that my hon. Friend recognises is somewhat clumsy. It is clumsy because it is based on UN principles on the independence of the judiciary. The principles are simply that. They were never supposed to be translated into statutory form.

Seamus Mallon: Is the Minister implying that we should never confuse principle with legislation?

Des Browne: I thank my hon. Friend for what I consider to be a somewhat mischievous intervention.
 I was explaining why my hon. Friend found himself with an amendment that is, in his own words, clumsy. It was drafted by people who did not expect it to turn up in legislation, but were doing it for the purpose of setting out principles against which legislation or the law of a country that accepted those principles could be judged. The consequence is that the amendment contains some inelegant language and a lack of definition. Most importantly, it would impose no duty on anyone. The statement of the principles does not lend itself to duties. 
 My hon. Friend will be reassured that the protection of the principles is already contained in Northern Irish law. As is reflected in the oath, in whatever form it is taken, judges must act without bias or the appearance of bias. That is already the law throughout the United Kingdom, and the amendment is not needed to ensure it. The principles are protected also by criminal law, because any attempt to subvert them would be either an attempt to pervert the course of justice or, if successful, a perversion of the course of justice. The sanctions of criminal law already protect the principles that are set out by the UN.
 Although the amendment was welcome and allowed us to debate the principles in the context of this important Bill, it would add nothing to the existing law. I recognise the point, which was well made by my hon. Friend the Member for Newry and Armagh, that we must get the message out to the people and reassure them that they are being served by a system of justice that is compliant with such principles. If they do not understand that the existing law does that, restating it in the Bill in an inelegant and clumsy fashion will not help. I hope that my hon. Friend is reassured that the principles that he wants to protect are protected by existing law and that he will agree to withdraw the amendment, because it would risk confusing matters considerably.

Seamus Mallon: I thank the Minister for his comments, the hon. and learned Member for Harborough for a valid point about the oath, and the hon. Member for North Down for the point that she made on human rights legislation. The Minister and the two Members are right up to a point. That point is something that will always be at variance when it comes to writing legislation, but a lay person would want to know what it is and how legislative draftsmanship, as the hon. and learned Gentleman rightly said, would write it so that secrecy is maintained at all times. The three points were valid, and I thank the hon. Members for helping me to make up my mind. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Des Browne: I shall speak briefly, given that we have extensively debated aspects of the clause.
 The clause places those with responsibility for the administration of justice in Northern Ireland—I defined them earlier, so will not go over that again—under a duty to uphold the continued independence of the judiciary. The criminal justice review group's terms of reference under the Belfast agreement specifically required that it should consider safeguarding the independence of the judiciary. In making its recommendation, the review group drew on views expressed during the consultation period and took account of human rights instruments and international best practice. It recommended that primary Westminster legislation enshrine the independence of the judiciary, and the Government agree that the independence of the judiciary is of paramount importance and must be protected. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Crispin Blunt: I rise to support the clause, but wish to draw attention to the wide-ranging nature of the debate, the importance of words in defining ''independence'' and the difficulty in defining such concepts. It is extremely difficult to nail these things down precisely. We examined the clause by reference to the experiences in Northern Ireland and the attempts to administer justice in Scotland, Zimbabwe
 and other jurisdictions where circumstances are either normal, abnormal or, as in the case of Northern Ireland, somewhere between the two.
 What seemed an entirely uncontroversial clause has properly taken some time in the Committee. We have had an opportunity to examine immensely important concepts, and we shall want to return on Report to the issue of the independence of the legal profession. I am grateful to the hon. Member for Newry and Armagh for proposing the amendment. It showed how difficult and important the issue is in the context of Northern Ireland and the Belfast agreement. Our consideration must be careful, and we must understand the meanings that words have for different parts of the community, knowing perfectly well that the word ''community'' is somewhat loaded, as well.

Lady Hermon: I wish to add my support for the clause to that of the hon. Member for Reigate and the Minister. I also wish to record my appreciation of the hon. Member for Newry and Armagh for withdrawing amendment No. 80. Like him, I believe that we are dealing with sensitive issues. I hope that we in the Committee can agree to disagree in a tone and manner that are pleasant and constructive.

Lembit Öpik: Without the clause, the Bill would not make much sense. Nevertheless, we have had the debate and concluded that we need it. As we have covered the points, I hope that we can maintain a shorthand as we proceed. We have spent a lot of time on the issues, and there would not be much benefit in returning to them repeatedly.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 1 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 2 - Appointment and removal

Lady Hermon: I beg to move amendment No. 86, in page 1, line 10, after 'Appeal', insert—
'or Judge of the High Court'.'

Derek Conway: With this it will be convenient to take the following amendments: No. 87, in page 2, line 9, at end insert:
 '( ) No order under subsection (2)(a) may add an office listed under subsection (1)(a).'
 No. 88, in schedule 1, page 70, line 4, leave out: 
'judge of the High Court.' 
No. 128, in clause 5, page 4, line 4, after 'judicial offices', insert: 
'or the office of Judge of the High Court'.
 No. 135, in clause 6, page 5, line 31, leave out subsection (10). 
 No. 136, in clause 7, page 6, line 6, leave out subsection (7).

Lady Hermon: I apologise for a typing error in amendment No. 86: ''or'' should read ''and''.
 The amendments relate to the classification of members of the judiciary. The purpose of amendment No. 86 is to approve High Court judges. The number 
 of judges in Northern Ireland is small compared with the rest of the United Kingdom. We have seven such judges. In the amended clause, High Court judges would be listed and considered with the office of the Lord Chief Justice, and the Lords Justices of Appeal, of which Northern Ireland has three. In clause 2(1)(a) and (b), the offices of the Lord Chief Justice and the Lord Justice of Appeal stand on their own. The offices of the other judicial members are listed in schedule 1. For ease of reference, schedule 1 is on page 70 of the Bill. It is proposed that High Court judges are listed with county court judges and members of the mental health tribunal, but I believe that they should be considered with the Lord Chief Justice and the Lords Justices of Appeal. 
 Amendments Nos. 88 and 128 are simply paving amendments that are necessitated by my proposed change to clause 2. I want the Minister to consider the reclassification of the High Court judges because of the implications for their appointment and, more importantly, for their removal. The procedure in clause 6(10) does not apply to High Court judges. Instead, High Court judges can be removed under clause 7(2) 
''by the First Minister and deputy First Minister, acting jointly.''
 Amendments Nos. 135 and 136 seek to delete the reference to the removal of High Court judges in those two clauses. The only way that High Court judges could be listed in clause 2 with the Lord Chief Justice and the Lords Justices of Appeal would be under clause 2(2), which states that the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, acting jointly, may by order add or omit an office to those mentioned in schedule 1. The amendment would provide that clarification, so it is an easy amendment to accept. The seven High Court judges—not a great number—should be classified with the other senior judicial appointments of the Lord Chief Justice and the Lords Justices of Appeal.

Lembit Öpik: Having listened to the hon. Lady, it seems clear that she and her party are attempting to codify High Court judges in a different way than originally suggested in the Bill. Her rationale convinces me that the proposal is sensible and I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say about it.

Des Browne: I am grateful to the hon. Lady for explaining the amendments to the Committee. I shall endeavour to deal with them in the same order and clarify the Government's position. My interpretation of the amendments generally suggests an inherent inconsistency. If it is accidental, the Government will have the opportunity to instruct Parliamentary Counsel on drafting. Words sometimes creep in. I shall attempt to summarise the hon. Lady's argument and the Government's response. I hope that she will make it clear if she believes that I have misunderstood her.
 Amendments Nos. 86 and 88 are designed to include High Court judges within the procedures for appointment to senior judicial office and to remove them from the remit of the Judicial Appointments Commission. If the amendments were accepted, the 
 Judicial Appointments Commission would have no power to recommend appointments at High Court level. 
 Amendment No. 128, however, would do the exact opposite. It would require all appointees to the High Court to be recommended by the commission, which is what the Bill provides. If I am wrong, the hon. Lady will point it out, but that seems to be the effect of the amendment. It is important to understand the historical context. Under Stormont, the appointment of High Court judges was reserved to Westminster, and the hon. Lady wants to retain the distinction. Whatever the arguments in the past, we are confident that the structures proposed in the Bill and by the review will prove strong enough to bear the devolution of appointments at this higher level. 
 Significantly in the UK context, the review's recommendations are exactly in line with what takes place in Scotland, where appointments to the equivalent level are devolved. The hon. Lady will be aware that a Judicial Appointments Commission is currently being appointed, although in a different fashion from what is proposed in the Bill. The Scottish context is similar, and there is merit in consistency with 
 respect to devolved Administrations. I well know that Scotland is not Northern Ireland because I have travelled between them on more than one occasion. The Government also see merit in consistency within the United Kingdom context in respect of responsibility for appointments. 
 Amendment No. 87 would prevent the First Minister and Deputy First Minister from using their order-making power under clause 2(2) to bring the offices of Lord Chief Justice and Lord Justice of Appeal into the remit of the Judicial Appointments Commission. The amendment is probably unnecessary. The review made it clear that it was not policy to extend devolution to those posts. Any order under clause 2 would require a cross-community vote under clause 82(2)(a), and require the agreement of the Lord Chief Justice. Surely those are safeguards enough for protecting the policies expressed in the review and accepted by the Government. 
 The hon. Lady expressed the theoretical possibility of an order— 
It being One o'clock, The Chairman adjourned the Committee without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order. 
 Adjourned till this day at half-past Four o'clock.